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IMMATERIAL BEINGS 
 
1. Introduction 
Holes seem to present something of a metaphysical problem. For in some good 
sense they seem to be essentially absences: holes are where things are not. Buy-
ing into something like that conception has led metaphysicians to see the prob-
lem of holes as highly domain specific and largely independent of more general 
issues regarding the metaphysics of paradigm material objects and of space-
time. That, in turn, has led many metaphysicians to ignore the problem of holes 
altogether (is worrying about holes really engaging in proper and worthy meta-
physics?) and has polarized remaining metaphysicians into those who endorse 
what I will call an inflationary theory of holes, and those who endorse what I 
will call a deflationary theory. For once we conceptualize holes in terms of ab-
sences, two opposite positions naturally present themselves. On the one hand 
there are those who hold that folk intuitions are basically right about holes: holes 
exist roughly where we think they do. Thus in the relevant region there exists 
some entity1 which is a hole. But since holes are absences, the entity in question 
cannot be an ordinary material one: it must be a special kind of entity. Hence the 
idea of immaterial beings2 is born. This view might, perhaps uncharitably, be 
thought of as one in which we reify absences: absences are real entities; they are 
immaterial beings. Views of this kind are inflationary. The advantage of infla-
tionary views is that we get to say that roughly speaking, the folk are right about 
the location and number of holes in the world. The disadvantage is that it re-
quires an account of immaterial beings. Those who find the idea of immaterial 
beings and the reification of absences objectionable, instead embrace some sort 
of deflationary view according to which holes are identified with proper parts or 
surfaces of paradigm material objects3. The advantage of these views is that no 
recherché metaphysics of immaterial beings is necessary. The disadvantage is 
that it does serious damage to many of our folk intuitions about holes.  
This paper defends a view that falls somewhere between the two extremes 
of inflationary and deflationary accounts, and it does so by rejecting the initial 
conceptualization of holes in terms of absences. Once we move away from this 
conception, I argue, we can see that there are no special metaphysical problems 
associated with holes. Rather, whatever one’s preferred metaphysics of para-
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digm material objects, that account can equally be applied to holes. This means 
that like the deflationist, I am entity monist: I reject the idea that there are any 
immaterial beings. On the other hand, like the inflationist I reject the idea that 
we should identify holes with parts or surfaces of paradigm objects. Like the 
inflationist, I hold that there exist entities in roughly the regions of space-time 
where pre-theoretically we would say there exist holes, and those entities are 
holes. Call this latter part of the view—that where the folk are apt to claim there 
is a hole, that hole has roughly the dimensions that the folk attribute to it—hole-
instinctivism (the view that our instincts about hole location/dimension are 
roughly right). Ultimately I embrace hole conventionalism, a view that includes 
commitment to both entity monism and hole-instinctivism. According to hole 
conventionalism, holes are no more ontologically problematic than statues, nor 
are they of a fundamentally different ontological kind from statues.  
This means that in a very strong sense there is no domain specific problem 
of holes. This is not just the (I take it true) claim that within metaphysics, appar-
ent domain specificity dissolves once we see that no claim exists in a vacuum: 
when we commit to one view we thereby commit to a whole package of other 
views. It is rather the stronger claim that there is not even apparent domain 
specificity, for there is no special ‘hole problem’.  
There must be reasons, however, why many are drawn to hole deflation-
ism. In section 2, I consider some reasons why we might be suspicious of the 
idea that there exist entities just where we think there exist holes. These worries 
are often expressed as doubts about the coherence of the notion of immaterial 
beings, and it is easy to see why, if one assumes that hole-instinctivism entails 
that holes are immaterial beings. Though I deny this entailment, many of the 
arguments against thinking of holes as immaterial beings are equally good, or, as 
I argue, bad arguments against hole-instinctivism. Thus, section 2 is devoted to 
defending hole-instinctivism, and with it, one of the central contentions of an 
inflationary account. In section 3 I turn to consider whether the other crucial 
claim of inflationary accounts, namely that there is a viable distinction to be 
drawn between material and immaterial beings, can be sustained. I argue that it 
cannot. Finally, in section 4 I draw together the threads of the account of hole 
conventionalism that have emerged throughout the previous two sections and 
add some meat to the bones of the account. I argue that this account not only 
steers a plausible path between inflationary and deflationary accounts, preserv-
ing the best of both, but importantly, it also allows us to treat holes as being on a 
par with any other entity.  
2. Of Respectable Entities 
There are a number of different theories of holes that can be broadly categorized 
as either inflationary or deflationary. The most carefully constructed inflationary 
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theory is that of Casati and Varzi, according to which holes are a sub-class of 
immaterial being. Though Casati and Varzi do not provide a general account of 
immaterial beings, it is clear that whatever else they are, they are beings that 
occupy regions of space-time. Holes then, are immaterial beings with a certain 
topology and ontological dependence—they ontologically depend on hole-hosts: 
material beings. As Casati and Varzi put it, holes are immaterial beings “‘grow-
ing’ parasitically, like negative mushrooms, at the surfaces of material beings”.4 
One might also think of Hoffman and Richards’ proposal as an inflationary one.5 
Their primary interest lies in explicating how it is that we recognize shapes, and 
to that end they are interested in objects and their parts. But they raise the idea 
that objects might have both positive and negative parts, with holes being nega-
tive parts of objects.6 It is not entirely clear what this proposal amounts to, at 
least at the metaphysical level. Hoffman and Richards go to some lengths to 
define parthood in terms of topology, but those details are not relevant here. The 
real questions pertain to the nature of those parts. It is clear that positive parts 
are material objects (or at least, we can all agree that they are material, and that 
they are at least potential objects). But what is the nature of negative parts? As-
suming that the distinction between positive and negative parts tracks some 
metaphysical difference, it is plausible that the latter are immaterial beings. In 
that case Hoffman and Richards’ view can be seen as a variant of Casati and 
Varzi’s view. Both agree that holes are immaterial beings, the difference be-
tween the proposals lies in how holes are related to their material hole-hosts. For 
Casati and Varzi, holes are not parts of material objects. Rather, they suggest 
that they are parts of some larger immaterial being that is the complement of the 
material object or objects in question. I return to this issue later. For now, we 
need only note that on a plausible reading of Hoffman and Richards, their view, 
like Casati and Varzi’s is a paradigm example of an inflationary account of holes.  
Arguably however, deflationary accounts are in the majority. Some of these 
are so deflationary as to be eliminativist. Frank Jackson, for instance, holds that 
there are no holes, but sentences that appear to quantify over holes can be para-
phrased into sentences about hole-linings and hole surrounds, even though these 
material beings are not themselves holes.7 Lewis’ account is a paradigm example 
of deflationism. The Lewises identify holes with material hole-linings.8 Thus 
holes are perfectly respectable material beings. But hole-instinctivism is false: 
holes do not exist where we think they do, nor have a good many of the proper-
ties to which we attribute them. Of course, there are numerous variations to this 
sort of deflationism: one could identify holes not just with the hole lining, but 
with the lining of the entire material hole-host, or with the hole-lining and the 
material host itself, or with the hole-lining and some proper parts of the material 
hole-host. These are all variations on a theme, a deflationary theme that aims to 
identify holes with some part or surface of paradigm material objects. Deflation-
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ary accounts, therefore, deny not only that holes are immaterial beings, they also 
deny hole-instinctivism.  
But what it is about holes that pushes many towards endorsing a deflation-
ary account? After all, in general eliminativist or severely deflationary theories 
are in the minority, and are arrived at more as a last resort (the conclusion to an 
argument the premises of which one is firmly wedded) than a first option. One 
assumes that in this case deflationists have the uneasy feeling that if hole-
instinctivism was right, then holes would somehow turn out not to be meta-
physically respectable entities. But why?  
In what follows I consider a number of reasons for being suspicious of 
hole-instinctivism, reasons that can all in some way be explained or motivated 
by mistakenly conceiving of holes as absences. These reasons, or their close 
cousins, are usually thought of as arguments against inflationary accounts, and 
insofar as inflationary accounts are committed to hole-instinctivism, they are. 
But since hole-instinctivism is a weaker thesis than are any of the inflationary 
accounts, and since my view is committed only to this weaker thesis, it will be 
instructive to consider these arguments in the light of this weaker claim.  
First an aside. It might seem that I have reversed the usual order of pro-
ceedings by considering objections to a view before presenting said view. Unde-
niably so. The reason I approach matters in this order is twofold. First, if hole-
instinctivism cannot even get off the ground, then there is little point considering 
any view committed to it. Second, and more importantly, recall that hole con-
ventionalism is largely a meta-view: it is the view that holes should be treated 
analogously to paradigm material objects. The exact details of that view depend 
on one’s account of paradigm material objects (is one a three- or four-dimen-
sionalist; does one think that objects occupy or are identical to space-time re-
gions, does one endorse a counterpart or identity account of modality and so 
forth). Since likely we are all familiar with at least the broad brushstrokes of the 
different accounts of paradigm material objects, there is little point me rehears-
ing the details at this stage. Rather, we should focus on reasons we might have to 
suppose that holes cannot be treated analogously to paradigm material objects. 
Once we establish that there are no such reasons, then in most cases we can 
safely leave it to the individual to fill in the details of their own preferred ac-
count. Having said that, I do try to sketch something of the broad features of this 
account as we proceed to section 4.  
2.1 Ontological Dependence 
One reason we might have to be suspicious of hole-instinctivism is that it seems 
to entail that holes are ontologically dependent on other entities. Where there go 
paradigm material objects, there sometimes go holes. Holes sans material ob-
jects there ain’t. Holes, it seems, are logically dependent on material objects: for 
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every world in which there is a hole, is a world in which there is some material 
object that hosts that hole.9 
Framing the issue in this way makes perfect sense if at bottom one con-
ceives of holes as absences. For while a presence can straightforwardly be 
thought of as an ontologically independent entity, an absence would seem, by 
definition, to be logically dependent on some other entity: an absence must be an 
absence of something, or an absence relative to something. But this would seem 
to be a worrying sort of ontological dependence if one understands absences as 
presences of some sort of entity (an immaterial being, say). On the other hand, if 
holes just are paradigm material objects or parts or surfaces thereof as deflation-
ary accounts hold, then it makes perfect sense that there can be no holes without 
material objects.  
The real issue is whether hole-instinctivism entails an asymmetry in onto-
logical dependence between holes, on the one hand, and paradigm material be-
ings on the other. Casati and Varzi’s view is that the property of having a hole is 
an accidental property of a material object that hosts the hole. Hence one and the 
same (material) individual can survive the loss of a hole. A doughnut can sur-
vive losing a hole, though we may no longer refer to it as a doughnut, just as a 
woman can survive the loss of all her siblings, though we will no longer refer to 
her as a sister. If an individual is a hole, however, then that individual is essen-
tially a hole. Since we are apt to say that something ceases to be a hole if it has 
no hole-host, it follows that there is an asymmetry in the direction of ontological 
dependence of holes upon hosts. 
While something about the inter-dependence of holes upon hosts is clearly 
right, it is not clear why the hole-instinctivist should accept quite this picture. 
For this picture introduces the asymmetry right at the beginning, by holding that 
doughnuts, for instance, are accidentally doughnuts, but holes are essentially 
holes. Without getting too far into the domain of accidental and essential proper-
ties, it seems that the hole-instinctivist has two live options. One is to hold that 
holes are not essentially holes. Just as we can say that one and the same material 
individual persists through the loss of its hole (hence ceasing to be a doughnut), 
so too we can say that one and the same individual persists through the loss of 
its hole-host (hence ceasing to be a hole). Hole-instinctivism is the thesis that 
some entity, a hole, exists in the region where we would pre-theoretically tend to 
say that a hole exists. That entity might be immaterial (if an inflationary theory 
is true) or material (if entity monism is true). Prima facie there is no reason to 
suppose that just because a region contains a hole, that region would fail to con-
tain the very same individual if there were no hole-host. The entity in question 
would not, under those circumstances, be a hole, but that just tells us that being a 
hole is not an essential property of individuals, a claim that hole-instinctivists 
need not deny. Indeed, the idea that being a hole is not an essential property 
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seems no more implausible than the idea that being a doughnut is not an essen-
tial property (as compared to the idea that being a sister is not an essential prop-
erty). If an individual can persist despite no longer being a doughnut, then it is 
not clear why an individual should not persist despite no longer being a hole. 
The alternative is to hold that being a hole is an essential property of indi-
viduals. But in that case there seem equally good grounds for thinking that prop-
erties such as ‘being a shoe’ or ‘being a doughnut’ are essential. But then al-
though holes have essential properties that are relational—properties that depend 
on their hole-hosts—the same is true for paradigm material objects. A shoe is a 
shoe only if it has a hole for a foot. A statue is a statue only if it has the appro-
priate sort of surrounds. A block of marble does not contain a statue, even 
though there is some statue-shaped object within the block. A ten dollar note is a 
ten dollar note only if a whole bunch of other entities exist and conventions hold 
(reserve banks, currency conventions and so forth). In general, paradigm mate-
rial objects are the objects they are in part in virtue of their extrinsic properties: 
in virtue of the nature of their surrounds. So in this respect, they are no different 
to holes: both have relational properties that are essential. In order to create an 
asymmetry, we need to suppose ‘hole’ designates a quite different kind of prop-
erty to ‘statue’, and it is not clear why we should do that.  
2.2 Holes, Space-time and Stuff 
Another worry that is at least part undergirded by the notion of holes as absences, 
is that if hole-instinctivism is true then there is nothing satisfying with which we 
can identify holes. After all, with what can one identify an absence? More spe-
cifically, the deflationist’s thought, I take it, is that if we could identify holes 
with something respectable, then they could safely be admitted into our ontol-
ogy. Since they cannot be so identified, they should instead be identified with 
some parts or surfaces of paradigm material objects. Hence we should reject 
hole-instinctivism. But, as we shall see, this issue is surely a red herring.  
Space-time regions are one plausible candidate to be the respectable enti-
ties with which we identify holes. Even inflationists such as Casati and Varzi, 
however, are prepared to concede that we cannot identify holes with regions of 
space-time, on the grounds that holes can move around.10 More than that, I 
imagine, one might suppose that a hole could have existed at a different space-
time location than the one at which it in fact exists. Whatever the strength of 
these two arguments, they are certainly no stronger than the ones against identi-
fying paradigm material objects with regions of space-time. Clearly three-
dimensionalists about persistence cannot identify any persisting entity with the 
region of space-time at which it exists. Three-dimensionalists hold that each 
three-dimensional slice of a persisting object is strictly identical to every other 
three-dimensional slice of the same object. Since no two three-dimensional 
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space-time regions are strictly identical, three-dimensional objects are not iden-
tical to the space-time regions at which they exist. That is true regardless of 
whether the entities in question are paradigm material objects like statues, or 
entities like holes. On the other hand, we can identify four-dimensional objects 
with space-time regions, and we can do so despite the fact that they move about. 
We simply say that any four-dimensional object is identical to some four-
dimensional region of space-time. Then there is nothing to stop us thinking of 
holes as four-dimensional entities that are identical to four-dimensional regions 
of space-time: and that is so regardless of whether we think holes are immaterial 
beings, or are material beings but not paradigm material beings. So the fact that 
holes can move is no more reason to deny the identity claim, than is the fact that 
paradigm material objects move. Indeed, the fact that either of them moves is no 
reason at all to deny the identity claim so long as one is a four-dimensionalist 
about persistence. 
That it is contingent that material objects and holes exist at the regions that 
they do, seems a far stronger reason to reject the putative identity of entities with 
regions. However, there are those who are unmoved by such considerations. 
Perhaps they deny that paradigm material objects have the various modal prop-
erties we tend to ascribe to them.11 Perhaps they avail themselves of some sort of 
counterpart theory, thereby maintaining that objects are contingently identical to 
space-time regions. Hence under one counterpart relation—the space-time re-
gion counterpart relation—an object has one set of counterparts all of which 
exist at the same place and time—and under another counterpart relation—the 
statue counterpart relation, say—that same object has a different set of counter-
parts, namely a bunch of statues that exist at different times and places in differ-
ent worlds.12 Whatever one makes of that view, it is an equally plausible view 
about holes. Holes, we might say, are contingently identical to space-time re-
gions: holes will have hole-counterparts and space-time region counterparts. 
Some of the latter will not be holes, just as some of the space-time region coun-
terparts of the statue will not be statues. The point is, there is no reason to find 
holes any more problematic in this respect, than one finds paradigm material 
objects. So if holes are ontologically suspicious because they cannot be identi-
fied with regions of space-time, then so too are paradigm material objects. And 
if paradigm material objects are ontologically respectable because they can be 
identified with space-time regions, then so too are holes.  
Arguably though, most of us think that paradigm material objects are per-
fectly respectable even though we do not think that they are identical to any re-
gion of space-time. Perhaps then, the worry is that if we cannot identify holes 
with space-time regions, then we must identify them with something else. Para-
digm material objects can be identified with the ‘agglomeration’—the mere-
ological fusion, set, plurality or whatever—of material stuff in some region. Or, 
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in the case of many three-dimensionalist theories, paradigm material objects are 
related by the constitution relation to different fusions, sets or pluralities of stuff 
at different times. Casati and Varzi maintain that we cannot identify holes with 
stuff, because holes can survive the loss and replacement of such stuff (and, one 
might imagine, because a hole could have been composed of different stuff).13 
These worries are analogous to those raised with respect to identifying holes 
with space-time regions. If one chooses to identify either holes or paradigm ma-
terial objects with various portions of stuff, then one is pushed towards counter-
part theory (since the same object might have been composed of different stuff) 
and pushed towards four-dimensionalism (if the objects are composed of differ-
ent portions of stuff at different times). The point is that the very same chal-
lenges arise whether one is talking about identifying holes with portions of stuff, 
or identifying paradigm material objects with portions of stuff. For those who 
think that these challenges cannot be met, recourse is needed to a metaphysics 
that invokes some sort of constitution relation. But in the same way that we can 
say that paradigm material objects are constituted by different portions of stuff 
at different times, so too we can say that holes are constituted by different por-
tions of stuff at different times. Whatever one’s preferred way of thinking about 
paradigm material objects across time and worlds, the very same account can be 
employed with respect to holes. At least, it can be employed just so long as it 
makes sense to think of holes as being identical to, or constituted by, portions of 
stuff. And that, one might say, is precisely what does not make sense since holes 
are essentially absences of stuff. It is not simply that holes could have been 
filled with different stuff, or are filled with different stuff at different times: 
rather, it is that holes need not be filled with stuff at all.14 But if holes are ab-
sences, how can they can any properties at all, even dispositional properties? 
This is the problem that Casati and Varzi face given that they reject identifying 
holes with space-time regions or with portions of stuff (and, I take it, reject the 
idea that holes are constituted by portions of stuff at times).  
In the following section I consider, in the light of current science, Casati 
and Varzi’s proposal to solve this problem by appealing to the idea of a fabric of 
space. While the basics of this proposal are, I conclude, defensible, careful con-
sideration reveals two important things. First, it tells us that the idea of holes as 
absences, or at least, as reified absences, is deeply mistaken. And plausibly it is 
largely this mistake that is responsible for the division between inflationary and 
deflationary theories. Inflationary theorists think that in some way it makes 
sense to talk about entities that are absences, that is, to talk of absences as 
things. So inflationary theorists think that there exist immaterial beings. Defla-
tionary theorists think that reifying absences is crazy, and thus they think that if 
there are any holes, they must be identical to some part of a paradigm material 
being. What we see, however, is that the conception of holes as absences is mis-
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taken, and understanding this allows us to steer a middle ground between the 
two positions. Second, these considerations reveal why the distinction that infla-
tionary theorists want to draw between material and immaterial beings it not 
only unnecessary, but also deeply problematic. There is simply no tenable way 
to cash out this distinction. Ultimately this is why we should be entity monists.  
3. Material and Immaterial Beings 
What then, does the inflationary theorist say about the nature of holes qua imma-
terial beings, if immaterial beings are not regions of space-time, or portions of 
stuff? Casati and Varzi endorse the general idea of thinking of space itself as a 
sort of fabric. While they are at pains not to commit themselves to any particular 
account, this general strategy allows us to say something like the following. 
Both material and immaterial beings are made of space. Material objects are 
made of qualified space; immaterial beings are made of unqualified space.15 
Though the distinction is not explored in any detail, roughly, the idea is that un-
qualified space is bare space, while qualified space is space that is qualified with 
additional properties. So, for instance, what it is for there to be some matter is 
for some space to be qualified. Since it is a dispositional property of unqualified 
space that it can be qualified, we can explain how immaterial beings have dispo-
sitional properties, including the dispositional property to be fillable.  
The distinction between qualified and unqualified space is important to 
Casati and Varzi’s account, not only because it provides a way of explicating 
how holes can have properties, but also, I think, because it can be used to make 
sense of the distinction between material and immaterial beings.  
3.1 Material versus Immaterial 
At first blush, the distinction between material and immaterial beings seems 
straightforward. Not so. There are a number of distinctions in the vicinity, none 
of which are adequate. Here’s one. Material beings are all and only the entities 
that a materialist admits into her ontology (where roughly, materialism is true of 
the actual world if it contains either only the sorts of properties currently found 
in our best science, or properties that are discovered by a completed science us-
ing current scientific methodology). Then in worlds where dualism is true, 
‘spooky’ dualistic substances or properties are not material, and if parapsychol-
ogy is true, ghosts and other spirits are not material. I take it this is not sense of 
‘material’ at play here. Dualistic or parapsychological worlds are surely ones in 
which the dualistic or parapsychological substances or entities could have holes. 
Moreover, it is pretty clear that in the actual world, we do not think of holes as 
being scientifically spooky in the way that dualistic or parapsychological entities 
are. They may be metaphysically puzzling, but the existence of holes hardly 
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threatens anything one might plausibly call materialism. Here is another distinc-
tion: material beings are all and only the concrete entities with causal powers; 
immaterial beings are all and only the abstract entities that lack causal powers. 
Then numbers and platonic forms rightly come out as immaterial. But whatever 
they are, holes are not abstract entities: they exist in space-time. That cannot be 
right distinction.  
A plausible way to cash out the distinction is to return to the idea of quali-
fied and unqualified space. If we suppose that every world is made up of space 
of some sort, then we can say that material beings are ‘made of’ qualified space, 
while immaterial beings are ‘made of’ unqualified space. Then in worlds with 
ghosts, those ghosts count as material, since they are made of qualified space, 
while a hole in a ghost is immaterial, since it is made of unqualified space. 
Something like this is Casati and Varzi’s view. In fact, there are two views in the 
ballpark here. On one view, any region of space is either qualified or unqualified 
but not both: what it is to qualify some space is to make that space no longer 
unqualified. On this view, a region of space-time can be wholly occupied by 
either a material or an immaterial being, but not by both. Call this the exclusive 
account.16 This is not Casati and Varzi’s view. Their view is perhaps best 
thought of not in terms of qualified and unqualified space, but in terms of basic 
space, and qualified space. Every region of space-time is occupied by basic 
space. Basic space is the fabric of space-time. Some of that fabric is, addition-
ally, qualified by various other properties. This is consistent with Casati and 
Varzi’s minimal theory of immaterial beings, according to which for every ma-
terial being, there is some coinciding immaterial being. Call this the inclusive 
account.17 I return in section 4 to consider the exclusive and inclusive accounts 
more completely in the light of the hole conventionalist account. For now, what 
matters is that the inflationary account’s distinction between material and imma-
terial beings centers on a distinction between basic or unqualified space, and 
qualified space. But can any sense be made of that distinction. In the following 
section I argue that the answer to that question is ‘no’.  
3.2 The Fabric of Space 
Some aspects of Casati and Varzi’s proposal are, I think, plausible. While the 
Einstein-Minkowski view of space-time does not entail that there is a fabric of 
space-time, it is certainly suggestive of that view. Although Einsteinian relativ-
ity tells us that there is no absolute time or space against which, say, the accel-
eration of some object can be measured, there is absolute space-time. We can 
determine whether a bucket in an otherwise entirely empty universe is spinning 
or not, for the bucket will accelerate, (or not), relative to absolute space-time, 
and we can determine that by looking at the bucket’s trajectory through space-
time. And if there is something relative to which the bucket accelerates, it is at 
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least plausible to think of that as the fabric of space-time. Another way of mak-
ing sense of the idea of a fabric of space-time is in the context of string (or more 
properly, super-string) theory. According to string theory, space-time is com-
posed of a bunch of interwoven vibrating energy strands. On this view, there is 
just one kind of fundamental entity—the string—and what it is for there to exist 
different fundamental particles is for different token strings to have different 
vibration patterns. Thus what it is for there to exist some material being in a re-
gion, is for that region to be occupied by strings with a particular set of vibra-
tional patterns.  
Prima facie, string theory seems ideally suited to the needs of the inflation-
ary theory in providing a way to distinguish between qualified and unqualified 
space (or space-time) and hence between material and immaterial beings. It is 
tempting to think of a region of unqualified space or space-time as being com-
posed of strings with no vibrational pattern, and qualified space or space-time in 
terms of strings with various different vibrational patterns. Then regions of 
space-time that are qualified are occupied by what we traditionally think of as 
material beings. Regions of space-time that are unqualified are what we might 
traditionally have thought of as empty regions. Since only strings with vibra-
tional patterns have causal powers—different causal powers just are different 
vibrational patterns—these regions are causally inert. (Though all strings have 
dispositional powers since even non-vibrating strings have the dispositional 
power to vibrate, thus explaining how such a region has the disposition to be 
occupied by some material being). But, we might say, we were wrong to think 
that regions of space-time whose fabric is composed of non-vibrating strings are 
empty regions. Rather, they are occupied by immaterial beings, beings that lack 
causal powers but have dispositional powers, such as the dispositional power to 
be materially filled. 
If that were an accurate picture of our world, then it would provide a clear 
mechanism for distinguishing material from immaterial beings. But it would also 
leave many questions unanswered. For one might accept the fundamentals of 
this picture yet deny that there exist any immaterial beings, insofar as it is open 
to someone to argue that what it is for a region of space-time to be empty, is for 
that region to be composed of only non-vibrating strings. A region is only occu-
pied by some being if the fabric of that region has at least some causal powers, 
and some non-dispositional properties, and by definition, on this view all of 
those regions are occupied by material beings. Adjudicating that dispute brings 
us back to the issue of the extent to which it is independently plausible that there 
exist immaterial beings. But, as Casati and Varzi admit, if immaterial beings are 
causally inert it is a fair question to ask how we perceive, let along interact with, 
such beings. Indeed, something like this worry is perhaps what lies behind the 
claim of David’s Lewis’ Argle that: 
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All things are material. Either holes are somehow material, or else there are no such 
things. Maybe a hole is the material hole-lining that, as we so misleadingly say, sur-
rounds the hole; or else whatever ostensible reference we make to holes is secretly 
some other sort of language-game altogether, or it’s fictitious reference, or it’s just 
plain mistaken. 
It is easy to be sympathetic with that view if we think of immaterial beings as 
occupying empty regions of causally inert space. So it is at least in some re-
spects a good thing for the defender of immaterial beings that this is not, given 
what we know of current physics, a plausible view of our world. Modern physics 
tells us that there is no truly ‘empty space’ of this kind. If we distinguish matter 
from fields, (a distinction we can draw regardless of whether we embrace string 
theory or not) then there are regions of space that contain no matter particles. 
But there are no regions where the value of the fields is uniformly zero (even 
setting aside the fact that the Higgs field is at its lowest energy level at a non-
zero value). Since the uncertainty principle tells us that we cannot know both the 
value of a field and its rate of change, we cannot know that the value of a field 
across some time and region is a uniform zero. Indeed, if a field has a value of 
zero across a region at a given moment, then its rate of change is random. So the 
value of any field through a region jumps around a zero value, but does not re-
main zero for more than a moment. What seems like empty space actually has 
constant energy fluctuations at the quantum level. 
All this is to say that given ‘standard’ particle physics, there are no uni-
formly empty regions of space-time, and given string theory, there are no re-
gions uniformly composed of non-vibrating strings. That is good news for the 
defender of hole-instinctivism. For regardless of whether holes are taken to be 
immaterial beings, if we think they are entities that occupy empty regions of 
space-time, then we have some good reasons to be hole eliminativists, or to re-
ject hole-instinctivism in favor of some deflationary account. But if there are no 
empty regions of space-time, then on what basis do we deny that there exists 
some being in precisely the region where the folk would say that there exists a 
hole? One response might be to take umbrage at the use of the term ‘being’ or 
‘object’ in this context. Friends of restricted composition might point out that 
just because there are a bunch of material particles in some location, does not 
entail that there is some composite object composed of those particles. In gen-
eral, they might maintain, just because some region of space-time is occupied by 
‘stuff’18 of some sort or other, does not mean that there exists any being or ob-
ject that occupies that and only that region. While this is not my preferred view, 
it does not at any rate seem to provide a general argument against hole-
instinctivism. It means that there is no guarantee that any being exists in the 
relevant ‘hole’ region, but it doesn’t provide any particular reason to suppose 
that there isn’t such a being. There might be such arguments. Perhaps only cer-
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tain kinds of portions of stuff compose further beings: the sorts of portions that 
compose paradigm material objects. But that is unlikely. The remainder of this 
section argues that there is no viable material/immaterial distinction. And most 
of those arguments can equally be thought of as reasons why there could not be 
any non-arbitrary restriction regarding which portions of stuff compose entities 
and which do not, such that we can say that there exist entities where we would 
say there are paradigm material beings, but not where we would say there are 
holes. Absent some principled way of ruling in composition only in the case of 
paradigm material objects, there is no reason to reject hole-instinctivism.  
Nevertheless, the push towards accepting hole-instinctivism is certainly 
stronger if one holds that every region of space-time occupied by some stuff, is 
wholly occupied by some entity—that is to say, every filled region of space-time 
is wholly occupied by some entity.19 For then given what physics tells us about 
our world, it follows that there exists an entity in exactly the region where we 
are tempted to say there is a hole. And it seems natural to say that that entity is 
the hole, and thus that hole-instinctivism is true.  
Notice too that the fact that there are no empty regions means that the prob-
lem we raised in section 2.2, namely being unable to identify holes with, (or 
hold that holes are constituted by) portions of stuff because there are no such 
portions of stuff in the relevant regions with which to do the identifying, ceases 
to be a problem.20 There may be reasons not to identify either holes or paradigm 
material entities with portions of stuff, but those reasons do not include there 
being a lack of stuff to do the job in the case of the former but not the latter.  
So the story physics tells us about regions of space-time makes plausible 
hole-instinctivism. But it makes a distinction between material and immaterial 
beings difficult to sustain. The problem is that there is no scientific distinction 
that tracks the notion of qualified versus unqualified space. We cannot make 
sense of the idea of qualified and unqualified space in terms of a distinction be-
tween regions whose fabric is uniformly composed of vibrating strings, versus 
regions whose fabric is uniformly composed of non-vibrating strings, since the 
latter do not exist. Nor can we understand it in terms of a distinction between 
regions of space where fields at that region are at a uniform non-zero value, and 
regions of space where fields at that region are at a uniform zero value, since the 
latter do not exist.  
We might, then, be tempted to cash out the distinction between material 
and immaterial beings in terms of a distinction between matter and fields. We 
might say that material beings exist at space-time regions occupied by matter 
particles, while immaterial beings exist at space-time regions occupied only by 
fields. One minor worry with this idea is that it’s not clear that there is any prin-
cipled distinction between fields and matter once we realize that energy and 
mass are the same property. For then what it is for there to be some matter at a 
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location is for a particular field to have a high (energy) value at that location. 
Moreover, we know that just as every field is constituted by a particle of some 
kind—the gravitational field by gravitons, the electromagnetic field by photons 
and so forth—so too what we traditionally think of as matter particles—elec-
trons, for instance—must also be understood both as probability waves and 
fields. (Electrons, for instance, are the constituent particles of the electron field). 
So the relevant distinction between matter and non-matter is not a distinction 
that is tracked by the particle/field distinction. 
Now, none of that means that we cannot distinguish between the so-called 
matter particles and the ‘matter’ fields that they compose, and what I’ll call the 
non-matter field particles and the non-matter fields they compose. Then we are 
not distinguishing matter from fields, but rather, we are distinguishing different 
types of fields and their constituent particles, namely matter particles and fields, 
from non-matter fields and their constituent particles. Thus we could hold that 
material beings are composed of both matter and non-matter particles and fields, 
while immaterial beings are composed of only non-matter particles and fields.  
The real worry about this distinction is that it pretty clearly fails to track 
any sort of intuitive distinction between material and immaterial beings. Con-
sider a perfectly average hole in a paradigm material object on earth: a paradigm 
hole, if you will. No such paradigm hole exists in a region of space-time occu-
pied by only non-matter particles and fields. So if what it is to be an immaterial 
object is to be composed only of non-matter particles, then the paradigm holes 
we find on earth are material, not immaterial beings. Indeed, it seems unlikely 
that in the actual world, any hole in a material object will ever be immaterial in 
the required sense, since any region of space-time that is contiguous with a ma-
terial object is almost certain to be occupied by at least some matter particles.  
Return to Argle’s words for a moment. All things are material, he claims. 
But what does he mean by that claim? Is this the substantive claim that although 
entities might have been composed of something other than matter, in fact in our 
world they are always composed of matter? Or is it the trivial claim that what-
ever in fact the actual entities are composed of, that stuff is matter? Or is it the 
semantic claim that of the totality of entities over which we quantify, only those 
entities composed of matter are rightly referred to as things or objects. That is, is 
it the claim that by things, we intend to refer to only a sub-set of all the entities, 
namely the material entities.  
This last semantic claim is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Even if it is true 
that the semantics of ‘object’ or ‘thing’ are such that they refer to only the subset 
of entities that are material, the real issue is whether that subset is a proper sub-
set. The issue is whether there are any immaterial entities, not whether we 
would be right or wrong to call those entities objects. The second reading is not 
a very interesting one. If matter is just whatever it is that fills the space-time 
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regions in the actual world, then it is trivially true that there are no immaterial 
beings, but it might still be that there are two fundamentally different kinds of 
material beings, one of which includes the paradigm material beings, and one of 
which includes holes and other entities of that ilk. Perhaps then, the claim is 
intended as a substantive one. There are two readings of that claim. The first is 
the substantive claim that there are no beings that are sufficiently good deservers 
of our folk term ‘immaterial beings’. The second is the substantive claim that 
there are no beings that are sufficiently good deservers of some pseudo-scientific 
term ‘immaterial beings’. Given what we have said so far, there is good reason 
to suppose that the first claim is true. Suppose the folk concept of ‘immaterial 
being’ contains at least two clauses, such that there are immaterial beings only if 
there are beings that roughly speaking have the properties we associate with 
them (they exist roughly where we think they do, they are penetrable to para-
digm material beings and so forth) and there is some natural kind distinction (to 
be discovered by science) that underlies the distinction between material and 
immaterial beings. (It is plausible, I think, that the folk concept should in part 
defer to the natural sciences). Since there is no natural kind distinction that also 
tracks our intuitive distinction, we should be eliminativists about immaterial 
beings. It is this sense in which I am an entity monist. There are no immaterial 
beings, there are only material beings, and some proper sub-set of those are the 
paradigm material beings that we generally refer to and quantify over.  
Now, there is the second sense of this claim. That is the claim that there is 
no scientific distinction that we can draw between material and immaterial be-
ings, regardless of whether that distinction tracks anything that pre-theoretically 
we might have thought of as material or immaterial. As we have seen, there is 
some distinction that we can draw: the distinction between regions of space-time 
that contain matter particles (and fields) and those that contain only non-matter 
particles (and fields). It is an open question whether that distinction is a scien-
tifically interesting one. If it is, then there is perhaps a sense in which there are 
material and immaterial beings. But not the relevant sense in which we want to 
talk of holes and things of that ilk as being immaterial beings.  
So there is good reason to reject any interesting philosophical distinction 
between material and immaterial beings, and instead to adopt entity monism. 
There is also good reason to endorse hole-instinctivism: there really do exist 
entities in just the regions where we suppose there to be holes. Hence a view that 
combines monism and hole-instinctivism seems plausible. That view is hole 
conventionalism.  
4. Hole Conventionalism 
Holes conventionalism is the view that there is nothing special about holes: 
holes are not a particular sort of a particular kind of fundamental entity—a par-
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ticular kind of immaterial being. Rather, whatever the broad outlines of the story 
we tell about paradigm material objects, that same story can be appealed to with 
respect to holes. More than that, nothing of what I have said so far is particular 
to holes, as opposed to any other portions of space-time that we would not tradi-
tionally think of as being occupied by paradigm material objects. That is a nice 
feature of the account: it treats all regions of space-time as being occupied by 
entities of the same fundamental kind: material beings. But none of that tells us 
in virtue of what a particular space-time region is occupied by a statue as op-
posed to a dog, or occupied by a hole as opposed to a non-paradigm being for 
which we likely have no name. The idea is that there is nothing more problem-
atic in principle in determining under what conditions a being counts as being a 
hole, than there is in determining under what conditions a being counts as being 
a dog. Still, something more should be said about holes and their relations to 
other material entities, both paradigm and non-paradigm.  
Consider the following diagram where B and C are paradigm material ob-
jects and D and F are holes in C and B respectively. Since the diagram is two, 
rather than three dimensional, F is an internal hole in B, rather than a tunnel 
through B. E is the complement of B and C. What is the relation between D and 
C, and between B and F, and in virtue of what are D and F holes in C and B? 
 
Casati and Varzi suggest that we adopt what they call the minimal theory 
of immaterial beings, according to which for every material body, there exists an 
immaterial being that shares exactly the same location—immaterial beings oc-
cupied by material beings—plus some immaterial being or beings that occupy 
the complement of all of the material beings. So they hold that D is part of E, 
and E is an immaterial being, while F is an immaterial being proper.21 According 
to Hoffman and Richards, D is part of C and F is part of B, where D and F are 
negative parts of C and B respectively.  
Hole conventionalism has a nice way of dealing with this dispute. If every 
filled region contains some material entity, then there is some entity—call it 
B*—that occupies the region jointly occupied by B and F, and which has B and 
 IMMATERIAL BEINGS 365 
F as parts. Similarly, there is some entity—C*—that occupies the region jointly 
occupied by C and D, and which has C and D as parts. There is also an entity 
that occupies E (a spatially discontinuous entity), and has F and D as parts. Then 
the question of whether D is part of C, and F part of B, or whether D and F are 
parts of E has a straightforward answer. Strictly speaking, D and F are not parts 
of either C or B. But there is some object that looks a lot like a paradigm mate-
rial object, of which they are parts: namely C* and B* respectively. In part then, 
we can construe this as a semantic debate. The issue is whether when we refer to 
some material object in the bottom right hand corner of the page, we are refer-
ring to C, or to C*. If our referring term picks out C, then D is not part of that 
object. If the term picks out C*, then D is part of that object, but it is also part of 
E. Casati and Varzi think that when we refer to the object in that region we are 
referring to C, Hoffman and Richards think we are referring to C*. In one sense 
the debate is metaphysical: do paradigm objects have holes as parts?; in another 
sense, the debate is semantic: there are two possible candidates to be the refer-
ents of our term, and the question is, to which does our object language refer.  
It’s not clear that there is, or need be, a univocal answer to that question. If 
we thought there was some deep metaphysical difference between E, F and D on 
the one hand, and B and C on the other, then we might have some principled 
reason to prefer one view over the other. We might, for instance, hold that mate-
rial beings always have all and only material parts, and likewise for immaterial 
beings, whilst hybrid beings are those that have some material parts and some 
immaterial parts. Then if we had reason to suppose that in general, our terms 
tend to refer either to material beings or to immaterial beings but not to hybrid 
beings, (a not wholly implausible thought), then it follows that out object term 
picks our C not C* (since C* is a hybrid being) and thus it follows that D is not 
part of the paradigm material being in question. Alternatively, if we thought that 
composition was restricted in certain important ways such that for any two enti-
ties, there exists a fusion of those entities only if they are of the same fundamen-
tal ontological kind—both material or both immaterial—then we would con-
clude that C* does not exist, and hence that our object term does not refer to it. 
But we know that there is no such principled distinction: according to hole 
conventionalism, all of the entities in question are material. So the issue regard-
ing of what object D is a part is not one that requires us to think about positive 
and negative parts or material and immaterial beings, but rather, to examine our 
semantic intuitions about the reference of our object language.  
There is another issue that turns out to be largely semantic given hole con-
ventionalism. Recall that I earlier distinguished between two kinds of inflation-
ary accounts: inclusive and exclusive. Exclusive accounts hold that any region 
can be wholly occupied by either an immaterial or a material being, but not both. 
Inclusive accounts hold that both material and immaterial beings can wholly 
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occupy the same region. Casati and Varzi embrace the inclusive account because 
they hold that holes are fillable. If a hole is an immaterial being, and holes are 
fillable, then immaterial beings must be able to be occupied by, or coincide with, 
material beings. The exclusive account cannot allow that a hole persists after it 
is filled. Indeed, the exclusive view presumably cannot even say that there is 
some entity that persists through the filling, though that entity ceases to be a hole 
at the end: for prior to filling there exist an immaterial being, and after, a mate-
rial being.  
As I see it, folk intuitions alone don’t adequately distinguish between these 
two alternatives. We certainly talk about holes being filled in, or the process of 
filling a hole. But it is unclear if we think that there is still a hole, albeit filled, 
after the filling is complete. Hole conventionalism has a nice way of dealing 
with this issue too. Hole conventionalism naturally rejects the idea that there are 
coincidental material and immaterial beings. There is just one entity, D, though 
D may go from failing to be composed of many matter particles, to being com-
posed of a larger number of matter particles. That is, I take that being a hole is 
not an essential property of D—otherwise if being filled in renders D no longer a 
hole, then it means D ceases to exist and some other entity D* comes into exis-
tence. That position is consistent with hole conventionalism. But I take it that it 
is more likely that one would maintain that it is largely a semantic matter whether 
something counts as a hole after it is filled in (and hence not something that de-
termines the persistence or not, of an entity). Then the hole conventionalist can 
maintain that D persists throughout the filling process, hence explaining our 
tendency to talk as though there is something that can be filled, and which exists 
post-filling (contra the exclusive view). But it might well be that D no longer has 
the property of being a hole (contra the inclusive view). Plausibly, to talk of 
there being a hole in the road (when the hole has been filled) makes little sense.  
It seems plausible then, that the hole conventionalist will say that being a 
hole is not an essential property of any entity, and nor is it an intrinsic property. 
That latter is hardly surprising. Holes are holes in things. So while D might be a 
hole simpliciter, it is so only in virtue of being a hole in C. But in virtue of what 
is D a hole in C? Under exactly what conditions an entity counts as being a hole 
in some other entity depends on a whole range of conditions that vary from con-
text to context. Giving sufficient conditions for hole-hood is hard. But we can at 
least think of some general necessary conditions. There is something right about 
the idea of holes as absences— but not as absences of everything, and hence as 
causally inert, empty region of space-time. Rather, holes are perfectly ordinary 
material beings, it is just that they count as being holes in something just if cer-
tain relations hold between them and other entities.  
A hole in a paradigm material object is usually an entity that occupies a re-
gion of space-time where the density of matter particles is significantly lower 
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than in the region occupied by the material object, and where those matter parti-
cles are moving significantly more than the matter particles in the region occu-
pied by the material object. It is not, therefore, an immaterial entity: but it is an 
entity composed of less matter, and where what matter there is, is not bonded 
together in relatively dense clumps but is spread out thinly. So a hole in a para-
digm material object is an entity where the amount of matter in any arbitrary 
sub-region at which the hole exists, is substantially less than the amount of mat-
ter in any arbitrary sub-region at which the entity in which it is a hole exists. 
Exactly how much less matter there needs to be for something to count as a hole 
no doubt depends on context.  
And not all holes need be in paradigm material objects. Various non-matter 
fields might have holes. In that case, an entity might count as being a hole in a 
particular field, if the (fluctuating) value of that field through the region at which 
the entity exists, is substantially lower than the (fluctuating) value of the field in 
some surrounding region. Once again, exactly how much lower the value needs 
to be in some region for the entity in that region to count as a hole in the field is 
unclear: our conventions are not sufficiently well honed to answer that question 
as yet. The broad idea is clear enough though. There needs to be a particular sort 
of relational property between holes and the entities in which those entities are 
holes, a relational property of the following form: if the value of the matter or 
non-matter fields across the region R at which some entity E exists is fairly uni-
form, and the value of the matter or non-fields across the region R* at which 
some entity E* exists is fairly uniform, then the value of those fields across R* 
is significantly less than the value of the fields across R. Call relational proper-
ties of this kind H-properties. Then one necessary condition for E* being a hole 
in E, is that E and E* are H-property related. In addition to that, E and E* must 
be topologically arranged in a particular way. For a start, they must be spatially 
contiguous. More than that, E must have one of a range of particular topologies. 
Much of the work specifying those topologies has been done by Casati and 
Varzi. Call those topologies H-topologies. Then E and E* must be spatially con-
tiguous, and E must have an H-topology. Roughly speaking, these are the neces-
sary conditions for some entity E* to count as being a hole in E.  
The exact details don’t matter: for we are not specifying metaphysical cri-
teria that determine when some kind of entity—an immaterial being—falls under 
a particular natural kind—hole-hood. We are simply outlining some of the more 
basic conventions that determine when some material entity will count as being 
a hole.  
4.1 Holes and The Void 
There is, however, one final issue. I have argued that identifying holes with por-
tions of stuff is no more problematic that identifying paradigm material beings 
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with such portions. But, it might be argued, all of this relies on the fact that in 
our world, every space-time region is filled. Yet surely there could be worlds in 
which there are holes, but those holes are not filled with anything.22 And if that 
is the case, it would be odd to say that holes in our world are token identical to 
portions of stuff, but holes in other worlds are token identical to ‘voids’. So if 
there are such voids, then perhaps it is wrong to say that actual holes are identi-
cal to portions of stuff. We need to clarify a little here. There are two different 
senses in which we might understand the idea of a void. Suppose we are not 
substantivalists about space-time: we reject the idea that there is any fabric of 
space, instead holding that there exist material objects—filled regions of space-
time—and the relations between such objects. A void in such a world is a true 
void; an absence of anything. I set aside this view, first because it is not clear 
that the idea of a void in this sense is coherent, and second, because this would 
not be a world in which holes, if there were any, were immaterial beings. At 
best, in this world we could identify holes with surfaces of, and relations be-
tween, material objects. 
But there is another sense in which we might think of a void. Recall I ear-
lier introduced the idea of basic space, where basic space is the spatial fabric. 
That fabric might be qualified or unqualified, giving us the idea of qualified ver-
sus unqualified space. Then we can think of a region of unqualified space as 
being a weak void—an unfilled space-time region. Now, I argued that in our 
world there is no unqualified space, and hence no weak voids. But in a world 
with weak voids, it looks as though we want to say that at least some holes 
might be just such voids. That might push us to say that we should identify holes 
with certain regions of basic space. In a weak void world, (some) holes are 
regions of basic space that are unqualified; in our world all holes are regions of 
basic space that are qualified—it is contingently the case that in our world, 
all the holes are filled. For we know that actual holes have weak void counter-
parts, thus we should not identify actual holes with any hole filling. Some-
thing like this looks a lot like Casati and Varzi’s view, and I am not wholly un-
sympathetic. If we think that this is a good account of space, then it might be a 
good account of holes. Then there really do exist immaterial beings in every 
region of our world, all of which are contingently filled with material beings 
of some kind, paradigm or not, including holes. So in fact the issue is not 
whether there is any object that exists precisely where we pre-theoretically sup-
pose there to be a hole, for actually there exist two: an immaterial being com-
posed of basic space, and a non-paradigm material object that occupies just the 
same region as the immaterial being. The hole turns out to be the immaterial 
rather than the material being on this view, because the hole could have existed 
without the material being with which it coincides existing, as evidenced by our 
weak void world.  
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This presupposes a particular conception of basic space, one according to 
which we can imagine God making a world of basic space, and then qualifying 
that space in various regions. The sense in which it is contingent that every re-
gion of space-time in our world is qualified, is the sense in which when God laid 
out the basic space, He decided to qualify every region, though it is true of those 
regions that each could have been unqualified. That is, there are relatively close 
counterparts of actual space-time regions, such that those counterparts are made 
of the same basic space, which is unqualified.  
If this is our picture of space, then it probably makes sense to think of holes 
as being composed of basic space. But the other possibility is that God did not 
first make basic space and then qualify it, but rather, that God distributed a 
bunch of qualities, and in doing so created space. What it is for there to be space 
is for there to be this distribution of qualities. Then there is no basic space that, 
as it were, lies beneath the qualified space, such that that very same space could 
have been unqualified. There is qualified space, and that is all. So it is not 
merely contingent that in our world all space is qualified. In what way? That 
depends. Perhaps it is logically necessary that what it takes to make space is to 
distribute qualities. Then there are no weak void worlds, and hence holes are 
never weak voids. It is hard to evaluate that claim, but it is not obvious that basic 
unqualified space is logically impossible. But it might well be nomologically or 
metaphysically impossible. In that case, the actual world and its close counter-
parts are all ones in which space is qualified. In these worlds there is no basic 
space, and hence it is not true that any region of space could have been unquali-
fied: removing the qualities removes the space. So in these worlds we cannot 
identify holes with regions of basic space that contingently happen to be filled in 
virtue of the space being qualified: for there is only qualified space. So actual 
holes must be token identical to these filled regions. 
I do not intend to adjudicate between these two views about space. But it is 
worth noting that if we are happy to identify holes with filled regions as I sug-
gest, then actual holes are in no danger regardless of what view of space we em-
brace. On the other hand, if we suppose that holes are regions of basic space, 
and it turns out that actually there is no basic space, then it turns out that actually 
there are no holes. But it does not seem that the existence or not of holes is 
likely to stand or fall on recherché details such as these. And that, at least, is 
some reason to prefer hole-conventionalism to the view that holes are immaterial 
beings, or at least, that holes are immaterial beings by their very nature. Moreo-
ver, suppose the actual world is one in which there is basic space, but there are 
logically possible worlds in which there is no basic space. Then it still seems 
plausible that there exist holes in the counterfactual worlds in which there is no 
basic space. That is, even if actually there is basic space, it is not at all clear that 
our concept <hole> rigidly picks out all and only the immaterial beings in actual 
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and counterfactual worlds. So if we think that it is logically possible that there 
are worlds with no basic space, then likely we think that there are holes that are 
not immaterial beings. In essence, this means that if there are weak void worlds 
then some holes are what we might plausibly think of as immaterial beings, but 
that is not definitive of hole-hood. What it is to be a hole is not, I think, to be an 
immaterial being, though perhaps some holes in some worlds are immaterial 
beings.23 
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7. Jackson 1977: 131f. 
8. Lewis and Lewis 1970. 
9. Casati and Varzi 1994: 18, for instance, explicitly hold that holes are ontologically 
dependent in this manner.  
10. Casati and Varzi 2003. 
11. See for instance Heller 1990, chapter 1. 
12. This is of course Lewis’ 1986 view, and one that Sider 2001 also countenances. 
13. Casati and Varzi 1994: 35. 
14. Casati and Varzi 1994: 35 make this point.  
15. Casati and Varzi 1994: 33. 
16. ‘Exclusive’ because any region wholly contains, exclusively, a material or an 
immaterial being. 
17. Since some regions contain, inclusively, both material and immaterial beings. 
18. I use ‘stuff’ here in the broadest way not to mean just material stuff, that is, matter 
particles, but to mean whatever it is that fills any non-empty space-time region. Then 
non-matter fields and particles will count as stuff.  
19. Or perhaps, every filled region of space-time that is larger than Planck length and 
whose dimensions are multiples of the Planck length, is wholly occupied by some entity. 
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20. At least, it ceases to be a problem in the actual world since we can either (contin-
gently) identify holes with portions of stuff, or hold that they are constituted by such 
portions. I return in section four to consider what to say about other worlds. 
21. They note that F is an immaterial being proper, while D is a proper part of E. That 
is a little confusing, since F is also clearly a proper part of E. Presumably the idea is that 
D is a proper part of the external complement of B and C and hence D is spatially con-
tiguous with that external complement, while F counts as being an immaterial being 
proper, because it is an internal complement of B and C, and is not spatially contiguous 
with the external complement. See Casati and Varzi 1994: 36.  
22. Casati and Varzi 1994: 35 make this point. 
23. With thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell and Achille Varzi for many helpful com-
ments. 
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